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Search and Seizure-PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF A SEARCH INCIDENT TO A VALID
CUSTODIAL ARREST-United States v. Robinson, 94 S.Ct. 467 (1973);
Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S.Ct. 488 (1973).
While the fourth amendment' does not make a warrant mandatory for
all searches, it does require that all searches meet the test of reasonable-
ness.2 The search incident to a lawful arrest is one of the well-established
exceptions to the warrant requirement.' The incidental search doctrine'
and the exclusionary rule were first discussed by the United States Su-
preme Court in Weeks v. United States.5 The Supreme Court's failure to
enunciate definitive standards in defining the permissible scope of a search
incident to an arrest has created numerous problems for the courts and
police.' The limitations on the permissible scope of a search incident to an
arrest have been erratic, but the most recent decisions narrowed its scope. 7
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Go-Bart v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,
356 (1931); See Simeone, Search and Seizure Incident to Traffic Violation, 6 ST. Louis L.J.
506, 512 (1961).
3. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
4. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), the Court while discussing the
fourth amendment touched on the incidental search doctrine, merely stating that it existed.
5. The exclusionary rule established in Weeks requires the exclusion of evidence obtained
in searches which violate the fourth amendment. However, Weeks applied only to federal
courts. 232 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1914). Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), extended the exclu-
sionary rule to the states.
6. Supreme Court Justices have been less than satisfied with the results of fourth amend-
ment decisions. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) ("State and
Federal law enforcement officers and prosecutorial authorities must find quite intolerable the
present state of uncertainty [in the law of search and seizure]") (Harlan, J., concurring);
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 622 (1961) ("For some years now the field [of search
and seizure] has been muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire.") (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
There has been a similar dissatisfaction in lower courts. See, e.g., Amador-Gonzales v.
United States, 391 F.2d 308, 319 (5th Cir. 1968) (Godbolt, J., concurring).
7. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (dictum) the Court extended the
scope of a search beyond a person to the places which were in his control. In Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925), the scope of the search was broadened to the place where the
arrest was made. The Court then extended the proper scope of the search to the whole situs
of the arrest and to anything which could be connected to the crime for which the arrest is
made. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). Because of the broad application of
Marron, the Court narrowed the scope of the permissible search by saying that there could
not be a general rumaging for evidence. Go-Bart v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931);
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
Then the Court seemed to reverse itself by authorizing the search of an entire four room
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The permissible scope of the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest
had not been delineated by the Court8 until the recent decisions of United
States v. Robinson and Gustafson v. Florida.0 The arresting officer in
Robinson had probable cause to arrest the respondent for driving without
a valid operators permit. Following prescribed procedure," the officer
made a search of the respondent's person and found, in an inside coat
pocket, a cigarette package containing heroin capsules. These capsules
were subsequently used in the trial and conviction of the respondent for a
drug offense.' 2 The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground
that the heroin had been obtained as a result of an illegal search. 3 The
Supreme Court, however, felt that "[iun the case of a lawful custodial
apartment as a proper search incident to an arrest. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947). In Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), the Court limited Harris type
searches to instances where obtaining a search warrant was impractical. The Court placed a
time limitation on the search in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), where the
search of a car was held illegal when defendant was already in custody at the police station.
The Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), established the present standard,
which limits a search incident to a valid arrest to the arrestee's person and the area under
his immediate physical control.
8. It should be noted that the Supreme Court's attention has been focused on the permissi-
ble scope of the search of homes, places of business and automobiles. Until recently the Court
has paid little attention to searches of the person. In Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968),
the Court's only treatment of an intrusion into an arrestee's pockets, the Court focused on
the legality of the arrest; having established the lawfulness of the arrest the Court assumed
the subsequent search was permissible.
The Court has made statements, as to the permissible scope of the search of a person
incident to a lawful arrest, without discussing the permissible scope of the search of the
person. The statement by the Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) is typical:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapons the latter might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. . . .In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. . .Id. at 762-63.
See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 155 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
9. 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973).
10. Id. at 488.
11. The Washington Police had established procedures which required them to take the
operator of a vehicle driving without a valid drivers license into custody. D.C. Metropolitan
Police Dept. Gen. Order No. 3, series 1959 (April 24, 1959) cited in 94 S. Ct. 471 n.2.
12. 94 S. Ct. at 468-71.
13. 471 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1972). J. Skelly Wright writing for majority held that:
[Sluch search was unconstitutional and defendent could not be convicted of narcotics
violation since upon receiving defendant's fraudulently obtained temporary operators
permit officer had secured the only evidence of crime for which arrest was made which
he could possibly have cause to believe was in arrestee's possession. Id., at 1082.
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arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment but is also a 'reasonable' search
under that amendment.""
The respondent's major contention was that a search incident to a valid
custodial arrest should be limited to a frisk of the suspect's outer clothing
for weapons as in Terry v. Ohio. ," The Court in holding such a limitation
too restrictive questioned whether a protective frisk would in fact offer
enough protection to a police officer during the prolonged contact that
follows an arrest."6 Furthermore, the Court felt that it was immaterial that
the officer did not subjectively fear the arrestee, nor think that he was
armed.' 7 The minority disagreed, feeling that a Terry type frisk would be
sufficient to assure the officer's safety."' Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
14. 94 S. Ct. at 477.
15. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A policeman stopped three individuals after his observation of them
led him to believe that they were "casing" a department store for an armed robbery. When
the officer received an evasive response to his request that the men identify themselves, he
commenced a frisk of Terry. The officer first patted down Terry's outer clothing, not intruding
beneath the surface of the garments until he had detected an object which felt like a revolver.
The officer reached into the clothing and confiscated a pistol. A similar search of the other
two men uncovered another weapon. The Supreme Court sustained Terry's conviction for
carrying a concealed weapon, holding that the frisk conducted in this fashion was a reasonable
self protective measure under the circumstances, despite the officer's lack of probable cause
to make an arrest.
16. The Court was concerned with the possible danger of concealed weapons, stating that
it would be unreasonable to expect a police officer to place a suspect in his squad car without
taking reasonable measures to insure that the suspect is unarmed. 94 S. Ct. at 476.
Justice Rehnquist cited statistics that approximately 30% of the shootings of police officers
occur when the officer approaches a person seated in a car. 94 S. Ct. at 476 n.5 citing, Bristow,
Police Officer Shooting - A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 93 (1963) cited in
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972).
But the minority points out that virtually all of these killings are committed with guns and
knives, the type of weapons which would be detected. 94 S. Ct. at 486.
17. It is the fact of the arrest that is important. 94 S. Ct. at 476.
According to the dissent in order to make an intrusion beyond a frisk, the officer must have
a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed. Id. at 485. See United States v. Del Toro, 464
F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1972) (a federal narcotics agent felt an object which he feared could be a
knife or a razor blade but which turned out to be a folded ten-dollar bill containing a small
amount of cocaine, the court found the search unlawful); Tinney v. Wilson, 408 F.2d 912 (9th
Cir. 1969) (officer felt pills in subject's pockets); United States v. Gonzalez, 319 F. Supp. 563
(D. Conn. 1970)(cigarette package containing bags of heroin); Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6
Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971) (soft object in suspect's pocket which turned
out to be marihuana); People v. Bueno, 475 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1970) (keys in pocket).
18. All courts agree that there is a need to protect the police officer, but disagreement exists
as to the action necessary to assure that protection. In People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d
186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972), the court held that a pat-down search for
weapons incident to a traffic arrest must be predicated on a set of circumstances giving the
officer reasonable grounds to believe that a weapon is secreted on the motorist's person (apply
[Vol. 8:610612
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majority,'" pointed to the distinction between the two cases, stating that
the Terry doctrine was not applicable to an arrest founded on probable
cause."
The respondent further argued2' that the search of a person incident to
a lawful arrest should be limited to the fruits, instrumentalities and evi-
dence of the crime for which the arrest is made.2 There being no fruits or
a strict Terry approach to arrest situations); see generally State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 190
N.W.2d 631 (1971); People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E. 2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967).
19. Joining Justice Rehnquist for the majority were Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stewart,
White, and Blackmun. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion. Justice Marshall filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Douglas and Brennan joined. 94 S. Ct. at 477.
20. 392 U.S. at 21-22, 24-25. Terry did not involve an arrest for probable cause, but made
it quite clear that the protective frisk for weapons which it approved might be conducted
without probable cause.
The Supreme Court's language in describing the positions taken by Terry's counsel is of
considerable significance in distinguishing the cases:
[Hie says it is unreasonable for the policeman to take that step [of searching for
weapons] until such time as the situation evolves to a point where there is probable
cause to make an arrest. When that point has been reached, petitioner would concede
the officer's right to conduct a search of the suspect for weapons, fruits or instrumental-
ities of the crime, or "mere" evidence incident to the arrest. Id. at 25.
21. The minority contended that the search of the contents of the package of cigarettes was
illegal and the evidence gained from that search should be inadmissible. 94 S. Ct. at 486. The
respondent argued that once the cigarette package was removed there was no longer any
reason to look inside since the arrestee could no longer use it to harm the officer. But the
Court held that in arrest situations it would be too demanding to ask a police officer to break
the search down to a step by step analysis. 94 S. Ct. at 477. See Adams v. United States, 399
F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Furthermore it could be argued that keeping possession of the
package would create custodial problems for the police, and that there is always the possibil-
ity the package itself could harm the police officer. See generally United States v. Mehciz,
437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
Two Supreme Court cases suggest that the fourth amendment would permit investigation
of the contents of any containers. In Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), an officer
removed an object he thought to be a weapon. The object was unidentifiable because it was
contained in an opaque envelope. The officer opened the envelope and discovered burglar
tools. The Court, in considering the admissibility of evidence, focused solely on the question
of whether the frisk itself was reasonable. The court never questioned the officer's right to
open the envelope. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court never intimated
that the police should place any movable containers beyond the reach of the arrestee rather
than open them to determine whether they contain weapons or evidence. See United States
v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
22. The minority felt that all searches incident to an arrest must be based on necessity,
that is, a search ior weapons, or a search for evidence that could be destroyed, 94 S. Ct. 467,
480 (1973). The minority felt this was implied in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
We see no reason why, simply because some interference with an individual's privacy
and freedom of movement has lawfully taken place, further intrusions should automat-
ically be allowed despite the absence of a warrant that the fourth amendment would
otherwise require. Id. at 766 n.12.
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instrumentalities of driving with a revoked license, no search should have
been permitted other than a Terry type frisk,23 and that the drugs seized
should not have been admitted into evidence. Justice Rehnquist noted
that, although this was the first time the Court had decided this specific
issue, there is dictum justifying the use of any evidence found in a search
incident to a lawful arrest.2 The Court refused to impose the requirement
of a connection between the objects found and the nature of the crime. The
absence of probable fruits or further evidence of the particular crime for
which the arrest is made does not narrow the standards applicable to a
search.2"
As a result of Robinson, whenever a police officer makes a lawful cus-
todial arrest, the arrestee retains no significant fourth amendment rights
in the privacy of his person,26 and a thorough search of the arrestee is
The minority also relied on the concurring opinion of Justice Fortas in Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967). Justice Fortas felt that evidence may not be introduced if it is
discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to
the justification for their initiation. See Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968).
There had been a growing acceptance of the minority view in the jurisdictions that had
considered the question. See Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 315 (5th Cir.
1968); Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1960); U.S. v. Page, 298 A.2d 233 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972);
People v. Molarius, 146 Cal. 2d 129, 303 P.2d 350 (1956); People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247,
97 N.W.2d 16 (1959); State v. Curtis, 240 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971); State v. O'Neal,
251 Ore. 163, 167, 444 P.2d 951, 953 (1968); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264
(1964).
23. Judge Wright in his dissenting opinion in Worthy v. United States, 409 F.2d 1112, 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1968) agreed, stating that a Terry type search was all that was necessary for the
protection of police officers.
24. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) the Supreme Court stated:
[Elarly cases suggest that there is an unrestricted right on the part of the Govern-
ment, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the
accused when legally arrested to discover and seize fruits or evidence of crime. ...
[o]nce a search of the arrested person for weapons is permitted, it would be both
impractical and unnecessary to enforcement of the fourth amendment's purpose to
attempt to confine the search to those objects alone. Id. at 769 (citations omitted).
See also Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 831 (1960); see note 8 supra.
However, the Court would still retain some restrictions on the scope of searches. 94 S. Ct.
at 477, citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (pumping a person's stomach to get
narcotics was held to be an unreasonable search). But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966)(blood samples taken with a hypodermic needle for determination of alcoholic
content held a reasonable search).
25. 94 S. Ct. at 476.
26. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Gustafson briefly summarized the Court's
reasoning in both Robinson and Gustafson. Id. at 494.
Prior to Robinson and Gustafson there had been a definite trend not to allow thorough
searches incident to an arrest for a minor traffic offense, because it was felt that such searches
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reasonable.? Thus, the fact of the custodial arrest, not the nature of the
crime, is the key to whether a full search is permissible.
In Gustafson v. Florida,2 the petitioner was arrested for not having his
drivers license in his possession. The arresting officer conducted a thorough
pat-down search of the petitioner during which he discovered a cigarette
box containing marihuana. The petitioner was tried and convicted for the
unlawful possession of marihuana. 29 The Florida Supreme Court upheld
the conviction concluding that the search leading to the discovery of the
marihuana was not unreasonable.3 ° The Supreme Court held that a full
search of the arrestee's person made incident to a lawful custodial arrest
did not violate his fourth amendment rights."'
The Court's reasoning in Gustafson was essentially the same as that in
Robinson.32 There were, however, a few important factual distinctions. The
petitioner, Gustafson, had committed a trivial offense that carried no min-
imum mandatory sentence, and unlike Robinson there were no police regu-
were unreasonable intrusions on the right of privacy of normally law-abiding citizens. See
Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968) (heroin seized after search
of automobile after arrest for minor traffic offense held inadmissible as evidence); People v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970) (search of passenger
after speeding violation held illegal); State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971)
(admission of marihuana into evidence barred because search after arrest for defective tail
lights held illegal); People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967)
(arrest of defendant on speeding warrant, not grounds to search defendant's person); Ell-
sworth v. State, 295 P.2d 296 (Okla. Crim. 1956) (search of auto after arrest for failure to use
turn signal, held unlawful); State v. O'Neal, 251 Ore. 163, 444 P.2d 951 (1968) (arrest for
driving without a valid operators permit, did not justify search of defendant's wallet); Com-
monwealth v. Dussel, 439 Pa. 392, 266 A.2d 659 (1970) (arrest for running a stop light and
inability to produce registration not grounds to search vehicle); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d
116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964) (search of pockets with flashlight after arrest for minor traffic
offense held to be unreasonable).
But see People v. Brown, 14 Cal. App. 3d 507, 92 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1971) (full body search
incident to minor traffic arrest lawful if transportation to magistrate is necessary); People v.
Davis, 247 Mich. 536, 226 N.W. 337 (1929); Watts v. State, 196 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1967); State
v. Coles, 20 Ohio Misc. 12, 249 N.E.2d 553 (1969) (arrest for operating vehicle without rear
light or registration plate gave rise to a lawful search of motorist and vehicle for weapons);
State v. Giragosian, 107 R.I. 657, 270 A.2d 921 (1970) (defendant arrested for not having a
drivers license subject to search); Lane v. State, 424 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. 1967), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1967) (search of defendant's auto and person incident to arrest for
speeding lawful).
27. 94 S. Ct. at 477.
28. 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973).
29. Id. at 490.
30. 258 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972).
31. 94 S. Ct. at 491.
32. The Court relies on Robinson as precedent. Id. at 469.
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lations which required the officer to take the arrestee into custody. 3 The
majority, however, felt that these factual differences were of no constitu-
tional significance,34 and held as in Robinson, that once the suspect has
been taken into custody it is the fact of the arrest which gives rise to the
authority to search, and the arrestee's constitutional right of privacy is
legitimately abated23
Robinson and Gustafson give the police a standard procedure that can
be easily understood and readily applied. Although it is extremely difficult
to strike an appropriate balance between the personal privacy of the
arrestee and the physical security of an arresting officer,3 fourth amend-
ment rights should not be abrogated simply to make police procedure less
taxing.37 The Court demonstrates a great deal of trust in the police, a
feeling that is not shared by all. The Court, by deciding that the arrest
itself establishes the reasonableness of the search, has infringed upon the
average law-abiding citizen's right to privacy and personal dignity.
C. R. G.
33. Petitioner's counsel, in Gustafson, pointed out in his oral argument before the Supreme
Court that the Florida courts invariably dismiss the charge if the defendant shows up in court
with a valid license. 14 CRIM. L. RPwr. 4040 (Oct. 17, 1973).
Furthermore, Robinson was arrested for driving with a revoked permit and deliberately
falsifying an application, an offense which, in the District of Columbia, carries a mandatory
minimum jail term, a mandatory minimum fine or both. D.C. CODE § 40-302 (d)(1968).
It should be noted that the officer in Robinson stated that as a matter of procedure the
police always conducted a full body search if they were going to take the arrestee into custody,
and that they always took the arrestee into custody when found driving with a revoked
permit. See note 11 supra. However, the arresting officer in Gustafson stated that he only
took the arrestee into custody about four out of ten times in an arrest for a minor traffic
violation. The arresting officer stated if the arrestee was not a local resident he was more
likely to be taken into custody. S. Ct. at 490 n.3.
34. 94 S. Ct. at 491.
35. It should be noted that Gustafson did not question the validity of the arrest just the
validity of the search. The Court worked on the presumption that the arrest was in fact valid.
94 S. Ct. at 492 (Stewart, J., concurring).
36. One suggested solution to the problem would be for the legislatures to make minor
traffic offenses civil actions. This would make motorists feel more secure knowing that a
minor traffic violation standing alone could not establish the basis for a search. Another
suggestion has been to have the legislatures define exactly what offenses warrant a custodial
arrest, thus taking away the discretionary powers of the arresting officer. Comment, Search
Incident to Arrest for Minor Traffic Violations, 11 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 801, 804 (1973).
37. For a general discussion of the problem, see Comment, Search Incident to Arrest for
Minor Traffic Violations, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 801 (1973); Note, Searches of the Person
Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 866 (1969); Note, Scope Limitations for Searches
Incident to Arrest: United States v. Robinson, 59 VA. L. REV. 724 (1973); Note, Scope Limita-
tions for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 432 (1969).
For a concise summary of Virginia Law on incidental search see C. BERRY, ARREST, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE, 100-11 (1973).
